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ALASKA’S INITIATIVE PROCESS: 
THE BENEFITS OF ADVANCE 
OVERSIGHT AND A 
RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE  
Logan T. Mohs* 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska’s initiative process is unique—Alaska is the only state with a robust 
initiative culture and advance oversight over the content of initiatives by the 
Lieutenant Governor. This state of affairs is appropriate because it recognizes 
both the savings to the state and the benefit to citizens that advance oversight 
can achieve. It also places the power of advance oversight in the hands of the 
individual most qualified in Alaska to wield it. However, despite being 
generally commendable, the Alaskan initiative oversight process is not 
perfect. Because the Lieutenant Governor has this unique power, it is 
inappropriate for them to be elected on the same ticket with the Governor. 
This Note proposes that the Lieutenant Governor and Governor positions 
should be more distinct, by holding separate elections for the two offices and 
by establishing a standardized line of succession to the fill vacancies in the 
office of the Lieutenant Governor. On the way to this conclusion, this Note 
discusses a number of factors that should be considered before any change to 
the initiative process is made. The proposed change, however, does not run 
afoul of any of the concerns over changing the initiative process, and therefore 
should be adopted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past hundred years, direct democracy has established 
itself as a key component of the American system. Thirty-four states and 
the District of Columbia have some process for initiatives, recalls, or 
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referenda.1 As a result, approximately 203 million people, more than 275 
times the population of Alaska,2 are able to direct their government 
through ballot actions on individual issues. 
While the pervasiveness of direct democracy around the country 
may at first appear to negate any special claim Alaska might have to the 
process, Alaska is unique in that the Lieutenant Governor alone has the 
power to prevent an unconstitutional initiative from reaching the ballot.3 
Protecting Alaskan citizens’ constitutional rights against the will of a 
temporary majority within the state is vital.4 However, placing a 
metaphorical shield in the hands of a single elected individual rather 
than in the courts is much less clearly commendable.5 
This Note will argue that the Alaskan system should be preserved, 
despite its acknowledged shortcomings, but that the legislature should 
make some minor modifications. This Note will not address the more 
fundamental question of whether or not direct democracy itself is a 
beneficial or admirable aspect of a government. Instead, beginning with 
the presumption that some sort of direct democracy should exist in the 
form of initiative legislation, this Note will explore the Alaskan system 
and make some minor proposals for change, without arguing for either 
the overhaul or abolition of the system as a whole. 
The following Parts will each focus on different aspects of the 
Alaskan initiative process. To set up a framework for understanding 
how and why the Alaskan initiative process works as it does, Part I 
examines the Alaska Supreme Court decision of DesJarlais v. State, Office 
of Lieutenant Governor,6 which determined that the Lieutenant 
 
 1.  Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Washington, D.C., Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 35–36 (2009). 
 2.  United States Census Bureau, Population Div., Annual Estimates of the 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 
1, 2013 (NST-EST2013-01), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/ 
totals/2013/tables/NST-EST2013-01.xls (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 3.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2012) (“The lieutenant governor shall deny 
certification [of an initiative] . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 4.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (demonstrating a concern 
with “the superior force of an uninterested and overbearing majority” and 
noting that “there is nothing [in a pure democracy] to check the inducements [of 
a majority] to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.”). 
 5.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“I agree, that ‘there is 
no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and 
executive powers.’”) (quoting 1 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 186 (n.p. 
1748)). 
 6.  300 P.3d 900 (Alaska 2013). 
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Governor’s had the power to refuse to place a particular initiative on the 
ballot. Part II looks at the history of the initiative oversight process in 
Alaska by examining various lawsuits similar to DesJarlais. Part III 
examines other states’ initiative oversight processes to demonstrate 
what makes the Alaskan method so special. Part IV argues both that the 
initiative process should have strong oversight in some form, and that 
the office of the Lieutenant Governor should perform that oversight. 
Lastly, Part V argues that the legislature should be hesitant to make 
changes to Alaska’s system, paying particular attention to the reasons 
for maintaining strong oversight addressed in Part IV. However, Part V 
does also argue for a single minor change to the election code that 
would alleviate at least one potential problem. 
I. DESJARLAIS V. STATE, OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
In late 2010, Clinton DesJarlais filed an application with the Alaska 
Office of the Lieutenant Governor to certify his initiative relating to 
abortion.7 The “Natural Right to Life” initiative proposed would have 
added a new section to the Alaska Statutes declaring that “the natural 
right to life and body of the unborn child supercedes [sic] the statutory 
right of the mother to consent to the injury or death of her unborn 
child.”8 The initiative also provided that “the law of necessity shall 
dictate between the life of the mother and her child” in life-threatening 
situations.9 
Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell asked the Department of 
Law to ensure that DesJarlais’s application complied with Alaska’s 
initiative process as laid out by statute.10 After determining that the 
proposed initiative would be clearly unconstitutional,11 the Department 
of Law recommended that Lieutenant Governor Treadwell deny the 
application.12 Treadwell accepted the recommendation and did just that. 
Subsequently, DesJarlais sued.13 
 
 7.  Id. at 901; Initiative Petition List, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/pbi_ini_status_list.php#10NRTL (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2014). 
 8.  DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901; 10NRTL Sponsor Language, STATE OF ALASKA 
DIV. OF ELECTIONS, available at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/ 
10NRTL/10NRTL_Sponsor_Language.pdf [hereinafter 10NRTL Sponsor 
Language] (last visited Sept. 17, 2014). 
 9.  DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901; 10NRTL Sponsor Language, supra note 8. 
 10.  DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 901. 
 11.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman’s right 
to privacy). 
 12.  DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 902. 
 13.  Id. 
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The Alaska Supreme Court held that DesJarlais’s initiative was 
clearly unconstitutional, and therefore that Lieutenant Governor 
Treadwell’s denial was appropriate.14 The court examined United States 
Supreme Court precedent and determined that “DesJarlais’s proposed 
bill would preclude abortion to at least the same extent as the Texas 
criminal statutes at issue in Roe v. Wade.”15 Indeed, because DesJarlais’s 
initiative contained no exception to the prohibition based on maternal 
safety, instead providing for the “law of necessity” to govern in a 
criminal prosecution, it prohibited abortion to an even greater level than 
the statute in Roe.16 Because abortion would be restricted even more than 
the Supreme Court had previously held unconstitutional, DesJarlais’s 
initiative was clearly unconstitutional. 
In deciding DesJarlais, the Alaska Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
State can refuse to certify an initiative where controlling authority 
establishes its unconstitutionality.”17 This power is based in the Alaska 
Constitution and its initiative statutes. The Alaska Constitution allows 
the people to exercise only a subset of “the law-making powers assigned 
to the legislature.”18 And while a general rule exists in Alaska that 
prevents review of an initiative’s constitutionality before enactment, that 
rule does not apply when the initiative is challenged as being clearly 
unconstitutional, for reasons discussed in detail in Part II.19 
Lieutenant Governor Treadwell’s action in denying DesJarlais’s 
application was therefore an appropriate use of his statutory authority 
over initiatives.20 The Lieutenant Governor may deny a proposed 
initiative that would be clearly unconstitutional under current 
controlling authority.  
II. THE HISTORY OF INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT IN ALASKA 
DesJarlais was hardly the first time that the issue of denying an 
initiative has arisen. Since the state’s founding, Alaskan citizens have 
put forward 179 initiative applications.21 Of these, forty-nine have 
appeared on a ballot, fifty-four were successful but did not appear on 
 
 14.  Id. at 904–05. 
 15.  Id. at 904. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11. 
 19.  DesJarlais, 300 P.3d at 903. 
 20.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.080 (2012) (granting the Lieutenant Governor 
the power to deny certification of an initiative petition). 
 21.  Initiative History, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, http:// 
www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014); 
Initiative Petition List, supra note 7. 
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the ballot, and seventy-two were denied or withdrawn.22 Four initiative 
applications are currently active.23 These numbers, last updated by the 
Division of Elections prior to the November 2014 election, only reflect 
statewide initiatives and not those proposed as local ordinances.24 
All initiatives are subject to the constitutional and statutory 
restrictions and requirements imposed on direct legislation. Outside of 
those limitations, an initiative may, in general, cover any subject that the 
legislature can affect.25 However, it may not deal with some specific 
matters, such as dedicating revenues, creating or defining the 
jurisdiction of courts, or local or special legislation.26 To be approved by 
the Lieutenant Governor, an initiative must be confined to a single 
subject, must have that subject expressed in the title, must have an 
enacting clause, and must not include any restricted subject.27 Municipal 
initiatives must also “be enforceable as a matter of law.”28 
In 1974, the Alaska Supreme Court decided Boucher v. Engstrom,29 
which involved an initiative to relocate the state capital.30 The case was 
brought, however, before the vote on the initiative occurred.31 The court, 
relying on assumptions present in Starr v. Hagglund32 and Walter v. 
Cease,33 explicitly held that “our courts are empowered to review an 
initiative to ascertain whether it complies with the particular 
constitutional and statutory provisions regulating initiatives.”34 In 
support of this holding, the court noted the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s decision in Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,35 
which held that “[u]nless the courts [have] power to enforce those 
exclusions [provided by the people], they would be futile.”36 
In 1999, Brooks v. White37 clarified the holding of Boucher. Review of 
an initiative before its enactment is appropriate only when inquiring 
whether the initiative complies with constitutional and statutory 
 
 22.  Initiative History, supra note 21. 
 23.  Initiative Petition List, supra note 7. 
 24.  Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.030 (2012) (requiring home rule charters to 
provide procedures for initiatives). 
 25.  ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11. 
 26.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 27.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.040, 15.45.080 (2012). 
 28.  ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110 (2012). 
 29.  528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974). 
 30.  Id. at 458. 
 31.  Id. at 458–59. 
 32.  374 P.2d 316 (Alaska 1962). 
 33.  394 P.2d 670 (Alaska 1964). 
 34.  Boucher, 528 P.2d at 460. 
 35.  69 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1946). 
 36.  Id. at 128. 
 37.  971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999). 
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requirements and limitations on what the initiative must and may 
contain.38 However, review of the constitutionality of the provisions 
within an initiative is inappropriate.39 
In 2001, Edward Mahoney filed an initiative with his municipal 
clerk that would have imposed term limits on the Mayor of Kodiak 
Island Borough.40 The clerk refused to place this initiative on the ballot 
because she was unable to conclude that it would be enforceable as a 
matter of law.41 The Alaska Supreme Court made clear, however, that 
the issue is not whether the clerk could conclude with certainty that the 
initiative was constitutional, but rather, based on controlling authority, 
she could conclude with certainty that it was not constitutional.42 
The court compared its holding in Kodiak Island Borough with the 
ability of executive agencies to hold state statutes unconstitutional. In 
Alaska, “the executive branch may abrogate a statute which is clearly 
unconstitutional under a United States Supreme Court decision dealing 
with a similar law, without having to wait for another court decision.”43 
The court in Kodiak Island Borough granted that same authority to 
municipal clerks in regard to rejecting initiative proposals.44 
In State v. Trust the People,45 the court alluded to the idea that the 
Kodiak Island Borough advance oversight was exercisable by the 
Lieutenant Governor, and that the office was not simply limited to 
abrogating already enacted statutes.46 Trust the People involved an 
initiative that would have repealed the Governor’s ability to make a 
temporary appointment to fill a United States Senate vacancy.47 The 
state argued that this initiative would violate the 17th Amendment.48 
The court, however, refused to allow the Lieutenant Governor to decline 
to place the initiative on the ballot himself.49 Instead, the court held that 
pre-election review and oversight was only allowed in cases where 
Alaska law “expressly addresses and restricts Alaska’s constitutionally-
established initiative process,” or where the proposal is “clearly 
 
 38.  Id. at 1027. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 897 (Alaska 2003). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 900. 
 43.  O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995). 
 44. 71 P.3d at 900. 
 45.  113 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2005). 
 46.  See id. at 624 (failing to reference any possible prior limitation). 
 47.  Id. at 620. 
 48.  Id. at 624; see U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“[T]he legislature of any State 
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 49.  Trust the People, 113 P.3d at 629. 
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unlawful under controlling authority,” which the one at issue was not.50 
The court therefore drew on Kodiak Island Borough’s holding and applied 
the standard used there for municipal clerks to the Lieutenant 
Governor.51 
The next year, the Alaska Supreme Court decided Kohlhaas v. State, 
Office of Lieutenant Governor.52 In Kohlhaas, the court reviewed an 
initiative that would have allowed Alaskans to vote to secede from the 
United States.53 Unlike in Trust the People, the court in Kohlhaas upheld 
the Lieutenant Governor’s decision to decline to certify the initiative 
petition, because it dealt with a clearly unconstitutional subject.54 While 
Kohlhaas argued that his initiative was not clearly unconstitutional 
because no specific provision in either the Alaska or United States 
Constitutions prohibits secession, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on 
United States Supreme Court precedent to determine that secession was 
in fact clearly unconstitutional.55 
Alaska’s path to recognizing the Lieutenant Governor’s ability to 
exercise advance oversight over the initiative process was therefore a bit 
circuitous. Boucher acknowledged pre-election review by the courts, and 
clarified the concept in Brooks, but such review was limited to ensuring 
compliance with the constitutional and statutory provisions governing 
the technical procedure of the initiative process.56 Similarly, the 
executive’s ability to abrogate an unquestionably unconstitutional 
statute, recognized in O’Callaghan, did not clearly extend to proposed 
laws, but instead simply allowed the executive to react to rulings by the 
Supreme Court and abrogate existing laws.57 
The ability to abrogate, however, made sense to transfer to 
municipal clerks dealing with initiative applications because of the 
requirement that a municipal initiative be enforceable as a matter of 
law.58 If an initiative was clearly unconstitutional, it would not be 
enforceable, and therefore the abrogation could occur before, rather than 
after, passage. Trust the People brought pre-election oversight back 
around to apply to the Lieutenant Governor.59 There, the court 
recognized two instances for pre-election review: in addition to the 
 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See id. at 628–29. 
 52.  147 P.3d 714 (Alaska 2006). 
 53.  Id. at 715–16. 
 54.  Id. at 720. 
 55.  Id. at 715–16, 718–20. 
 56.  Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974); Brooks v. White, 
971 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Alaska 1999). 
 57.  O’Callaghan v. Coghill, 888 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Alaska 1995). 
 58.  Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003). 
 59.  State v. Trust the People, 113 P.3d 613, 624–25 (Alaska 2005). 
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subject-matter restrictions acknowledged in Boucher and Brooks, the 
Lieutenant Governor also had the power to refuse to place on the ballot 
a clearly unconstitutional initiative, just as municipal clerks had since 
Kodiak Island Borough.60 Although Trust the People overturned the 
Lieutenant Governor’s decision, both Kohlhaas and DesJarlais affirmed 
his denial of an initiative petition because both secession and abolishing 
abortion are clearly unconstitutional.61 Therefore, advance initiative 
oversight by the Lieutenant Governor, which was once considered 
inappropriate, was justified by first routing that power through 
municipal clerks who operated under a different set of statutory 
obligations.62 
III. INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
While Alaska is not the only state that allows its citizens to create 
laws through the initiative process, its granting of advance initiative 
oversight to an elected official is rare. As noted above, thirty-four states 
and the District of Columbia have some provision allowing for a form of 
direct democracy.63 Of those, twenty-four states and the District allow 
the ballot initiative.64 
The most common method of oversight in these states is simply to 
ensure that the initiatives have taken the correct form. Eight states 
require the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or a special council 
to review an initiative petition in this manner.65 Nine states have some 
 
 60.  Id. at 614 n.1. 
 61.  Id. at 629; Kohlhaas v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 147 P.3d 714, 
720 (Alaska 2006); DesJarlais v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 300 P.3d 
900, 904–05 (Alaska 2013). 
 62.  The correctness of this line of reasoning is beyond the scope of this Note. 
While certainly great deference should be afforded to the Alaska Supreme Court 
in its jurisprudence here, there is a strong argument that could be made that 
Trust the People and Kohlhaas were based on a faulty assumption that municipal 
clerks and the Lieutenant Governor operate under the same authority. In reality 
however, the requirement of enforceability is only present for municipal 
initiatives. While a further exploration of this discrepancy and a call for 
reconsidering the state of initiative law since Trust the People may be warranted, 
it is left to future authors to address. This Note instead focuses on the policy 
reasons why advance oversight by the Lieutenant Governor is desirable, rather 
than the legal justification for such oversight. 
 63.  See supra note 1 (listing states that have some process for initiatives, 
recalls, or referenda). 
 64.  Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, 
Washington, Washington, D.C., and Wyoming. MILLER, supra note 1, at 36. 
 65.  Arizona, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming. M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 
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form of non-binding, content-based oversight.66 This form of review 
includes public hearings, content reviews that the sponsor may reject, 
and assistance from state bodies.67 While seven states have some form of 
mandatory content review,68 only Alaska, Massachusetts, and Utah 
allow a single individual—in Massachusetts the Attorney General, and 
in Alaska and Utah the Lieutenant Governor—to substantively modify 
or reject a proposed initiative based on the subject matter.69 
Massachusetts, however, only limits initiatives that deal with 
specifically delineated subject matters or which infringe upon the rights 
of individuals as established in the state constitution; Massachusetts 
does not limit initiatives that are contrary to the United States 
Constitution or decisions of the Supreme Court.70 
Alaska and Utah are therefore the only states in which a single 
individual can refuse to place an initiative on the ballot based on the 
federal constitutionality of the initiative’s content before that initiative is 
enacted. However, Utah’s history with initiatives is less robust than 
Alaska’s. Early restrictions such as having to sign all petitions “in the 
office and in the presence of an officer to administer oaths,” and recent 
legislation increasing distribution requirements, have resulted in Utah 
only voting on eighteen initiatives through 2003—despite having the 
initiative for fifty-nine years before Alaska became a state.71 As such, 
Alaska is the only state with a meaningful initiative process where an 
individual has the ability to review and reject initiatives prior to their 
enactment based on their federal constitutionality. 
IV. THE ALASKAN INITIATIVE SYSTEM, WITH STRONG 
OVERSIGHT BY THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, IS BENEFICIAL AND 
COMMENDABLE 
Assuming initiatives themselves are desirable, Alaska’s laws 
surrounding initiative oversight are beneficial for two reasons. First, 
advance oversight in general, by some agency or individual, is 
preferable to the situation that would exist without such oversight. 
 
15 (2003). 
 66.  California, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Washington. Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah. Id. 
 69.  Id. While Idaho requires the Attorney General to review content, his or 
her recommendations are purely advisory. IDAHO CODE ANN. 34-1809(1)(b) 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.). 
 70.  MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2. 
 71.  WATERS, supra note 65, at 400. 
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Second, instilling the oversight power in the Lieutenant Governor, 
rather than in the court system or any other body, allows the political 
process to check the use of that power. 
A. Advance Initiative Oversight Should Exist In Some Way 
There are two primary reasons why advance oversight of popular 
initiatives is advantageous to Alaska. First, advance oversight prevents 
the waste of state resources on elections that will have no actual effects. 
Second, advance oversight prevents unconstitutional initiatives from 
being in effect for even a fraction of time, during which constitutional 
violations could occur. 
Running an election is costly,72 and passing a clearly 
unconstitutional amendment would likely result in “needless 
litigation.”73 While the courts “are primarily responsible for 
constitutional adjudication,” allowing another person to make that 
judgment, when the initiative is clearly unconstitutional, saves time and 
money at both the electoral and litigation stages.74 
Furthermore, advance oversight of the initiative process prevents 
unconstitutional laws from taking effect, even for a limited time. If a 
clearly unconstitutional initiative is prevented from being voted on, it 
cannot be enacted.75 If it is not enacted, it cannot be enforced. And if it 
cannot be enforced, no constitutional violation can occur. 
Imposing a strong check on unconstitutional initiatives before they 
have the chance of taking effect preserves constitutional freedoms and 
liberties. For example, an initiative completely banning abortion would 
presumably prevent at least some women from receiving their 
constitutionally guaranteed medical care.76 It would be wrong to allow 
that important constitutional right to be infringed until a case can make 
its way through the judicial system. It is better for rights like this to 
never be stripped away in the first place, rather than simply having 
 
 72.  See, e.g., State and Consumer Initiatives, The High Price of Uncontested 
Elections, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 26, 2013), http:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/news/2013/11/26/the-high-price-
of-uncontested-elections (describing various election costs for specific local 
contests as between $10,000 and $100,000). 
 73.  Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska 2003). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.220 (2012) (stating that a proposed law is 
enacted only when the majority of votes cast favor adoption—with no votes 
there can be no majority). 
 76.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (“A state criminal abortion 
statute of the current Texas type . . . is violative of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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them reinstated after their removal. 
This is especially important for rights that may be unable to be 
recovered once lost. A woman seeking an abortion may have to endure 
her entire pregnancy while an unconstitutional initiative banning 
abortion is in effect. Alternatively, she could seek an illegal abortion, 
which would pose its own risks.77 Either way, a court decision that 
strikes down the initiative only after extended litigation would be of 
little help to her. Therefore, not only does advance oversight of the 
constitutionality of initiatives preserve rights generally, it also is the 
only method of guaranteeing at least some those rights and preventing 
possibly irreversible harms. 
However, a determination that a proposed initiative is 
unconstitutional made before it takes effect “is necessarily advisory,”78 
and therefore judicial review is generally unavailable.79 Even though 
this Note considers administrative and executive review, rather than 
judicial review, that difference does not eliminate the general concern 
about the quality of a decision made without a specific case and fact-
pattern to be argued by parties with a genuine interest at stake. 
But while the difference between executive and judicial review 
might not change the advisory-opinion analysis, the reasons for 
requiring a specific case do not apply when the initiative at issue is 
clearly unconstitutional. The reason for that is simple: the legal question 
is settled and the debate is done. Specific laws may be written in such a 
way that it is questionable as to whether or not the precedent would 
apply, but at that point they cease to be clearly unconstitutional.80 Only 
when “controlling authority establishes [an initiative’s] 
unconstitutionality” should it be excluded from the ballot.81 Making that 
determination beforehand does not require any specific facts beyond the 
text of the proposed law itself.82 
 
 77.  See The Safety of Legal Abortion and the Hazards of Illegal Abortion, NARAL 
PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 2, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-
sheets/abortion-distorting-science-safety-legal-abortion.pdf (“The legalization of 
abortion in the United States led to the near elimination of deaths from the 
procedure.”) (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 78.  Kohlhaas v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 147 P.3d 714, 717 
(Alaska 2006). 
 79.  See id. (stating only two grounds for judicial review in this context). 
 80.  See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 992 
(Alaska 2004) (stating that a measure should be rejected only if controlling 
authority unequivocally asserts its unconstitutionality); Carmony v. McKechnie, 
217 P.3d 818, 820 (Alaska 2009) (requiring that an initiative be liberally construed 
in considering its constitutionality). 
 81.  Kodiak Island Borough, 71 P.3d at 900. 
 82.  See id. (referring to a clerk determining the enforceability of an initiative 
during the petition stage, therefore implicitly not requiring the facts of any 
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Therefore, because advance oversight of the initiative process saves 
time, effort, and money for the state and its citizens, and because only 
through advance oversight can constitutional violations be prevented, 
Alaska’s establishment of such oversight is commendable. 
B. The Lieutenant Governor Should Exercise Advance Oversight 
Over Initiatives 
Assuming that advance oversight over the initiative process is 
valuable, the question then arises as to who exactly should have that 
oversight power. Alaska’s choice to vest the Lieutenant Governor with 
the power to prevent clearly unconstitutional initiatives from being 
placed on the ballot is a wise decision for three reasons, one of which is 
uniquely Alaskan and two of which are generally applicable to any 
other state considering enacting an advance-oversight provision. 
The first reason—unique to Alaska—is that, by virtue of his or her 
office, the Lieutenant Governor is the elected official in charge of 
statewide elections.83 Other states typically designate an official such as 
the Secretary of State to oversee elections,84 but Alaska eliminated its 
Secretary of State position in 1970, re-designating and renaming it the 
Lieutenant Governor.85 
As the controller and supervisor of the Division of Elections,86 it is 
appropriate for the Lieutenant Governor to be the individual making the 
determination of whether or not a proposed initiative is clearly 
unconstitutional. This is a significant responsibility, and not one to be 
 
specific instance of enforcement). 
 83.  Duties of the Lieutenant Governor, OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
MEAD TREADWELL, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/lieutenant-governor/lt.-
governor-duties.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 84.  See, e.g., Secretary’s Duties, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SEC’Y OF STATE 
MARK RITCHIE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=1456 (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2014) (“The secretary of state is the state’s chief election official and 
ensures the office meets its statutory responsibilities.”); Elections and Voting, 
DEPT. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, BUREAU OF CORPS., ELECTIONS & COMMISSION, STATE 
OF MAINE, https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/index.html (last visited Jan. 
11, 2014) (“The Division supervises and administers all elections of federal, state 
and county offices and referenda . . . .”). But see UTAH LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
SPENCER J. COX, http://www.utah.gov/ltgovernor/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2014) 
(listing “Elections” under the Lieutenant Governor’s “Responsibilities”). As 
discussed above, however, Utah’s restrictive initiative regulations make Alaska 
a better example of a state with true constitutional initiative oversight vested 
with the Lieutenant Governor. See supra Part IV. 
 85.  Article 3 – The Executive, OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR MEAD 
TREADWELL, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/services/alaska-constitution/ 
article-iii-96A0the-executive.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 86.  Id. 
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entrusted to anyone further down in the administrative hierarchy. While 
other states that are considering allowing an individual to stop an 
initiative from reaching the ballot should delegate such power to their 
Secretary of State or other elected official, the Lieutenant Governor is 
most suited for that task in Alaska. 
Second, the Lieutenant Governor is an elected official and is 
accountable to the people.87 Unlike an appointed official or individual 
serving in an administrative position, the Lieutenant Governor has a 
unique connection to the voters themselves and is best able to know and 
effectuate their wishes. Allowing some other individual, disconnected 
from the voting public, to exercise oversight over the initiative process 
would be a form of fairly extreme counter-majoritarianism.88 Since the 
people directly choose the Lieutenant Governor,89 a public concerned 
about an abuse of oversight power would be able to select a different 
individual who was able to assuage their worries. Similarly, if the 
current Lieutenant Governor were to overstep his or her authority and 
strike down initiative after initiative without regard for whether or not 
they truly were clearly unconstitutional, the public would be able to 
vote a new person into office at the next election.90 Thus, the political 
nature of the Lieutenant Governor weighs in favor of having him or her 
be the decision-maker with regards to placing initiatives on the ballot. 
Third, the Lieutenant Governor is the appropriate individual to 
control what initiatives appear on the ballot because he or she occupies a 
high-profile position in which any abuse of power would be noticed. 
The same cannot necessarily be said of a lesser office, even an elected 
one, which may be less visible. Even the members of the Alaska 
Supreme Court, while high-profile as a collective institution, may not 
carry the individualized name-recognition needed to check an abuse of 
power. Furthermore, a decision by that court to refuse an initiative’s 
appearance on the ballot would involve multiple justices, each of whom 
might share a part of the blame.91 With the power in the hands of the 
Lieutenant Governor, however, there is no question about who made a 
mistake (if one was in fact made). The voters would be able to assign 
 
 87.  ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8. 
 88.  See Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’ 
Political Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 95–96 (2006) (describing how a Supreme Court 
Justice’s vote to strike down an initiative would indicate a Justice’s counter-
majoritarian inclinations). 
 89.  ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8. 
 90.  See id., § 7 (“He shall . . . serve for the same term [as the governor.]”); id., 
§ 4 (“The term of office of the governor is four years . . . .”). 
 91.  All majority decisions must include at least three justices because three 
justices constitute a quorum. ALASKA R. APP. P. 105(a). 
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blame where it was properly due and react accordingly. 
All this is not to say that there are no potential problems with 
assigning the power to refuse to place an initiative on the ballot to the 
Lieutenant Governor. However, the arguments in favor of the 
Lieutenant Governor retaining control over placing initiatives on the 
ballot outweigh the arguments that the Lieutenant Governor is the 
wrong individual to entrust with this responsibility. 
One danger with allowing the Lieutenant Governor to have the 
power to prevent an initiative from moving forward is that it seems to 
defeat the very reason the initiative exists. The initiative was first 
introduced, at least in part, as a way for citizens to create laws without 
having to worry about corruption in the legislative and executive 
branches.92 When the Lieutenant Governor is involved in the initiative 
process, however, this bypass around corruption is less effective. 
This argument is not persuasive, however, for two reasons. First, 
despite appearances, the Lieutenant Governor is not actually a part of 
the system the initiative process was meant to bypass. The Lieutenant 
Governor has no hand in the law-making process and is therefore not 
subject to the same level of distrust as the Governor or legislature would 
be. While it is true that in Alaska the Governor and Lieutenant Governor 
run on the same ticket,93 the assumption that this alone makes the 
Lieutenant Governor unfit for this task condemns him based on his 
associations rather than his own deeds. 
Second, even if the line between the Lieutenant Governor and the 
political organs the initiative is meant to bypass were still too narrow for 
comfort, the decision of the Lieutenant Governor to refuse to put an 
initiative question on the ballot is reviewable by the courts.94 The 
Lieutenant Governor is therefore checked in his ability to manipulate the 
system and to squash the will of the people. This judicial review of the 
Lieutenant Governor’s oversight, however, does not simply fold 
Alaska’s system into the same mold as that of some other states. For 
example, Florida’s supreme court is the body that makes the 
constitutional determination initially, while Alaska’s court can only 
 
 92.  See MILLER, supra note 1, at 23 (“[Many Americans in the 1890s] believed 
that the government had been captured by powerful economic interests and . . . 
the constitutional design prevented majorities from breaking the corrupt axis of 
economic and political power”). But see RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: 
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 177 (2002) (“This mythic portrayal 
exaggerates the corruption of state legislatures.”). Exaggeration, however, does 
not mean there is not a grain of truth to the story. 
 93.  See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8 (“The candidate whose name appears on 
the ballot jointly with that of the successful candidate for governor shall be 
elected lieutenant governor.”). 
 94.  ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
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review a determination already made by the Lieutenant Governor.95 
Therefore, while the courts can check the Lieutenant Governor’s power, 
he or she still possesses the ability to prevent an initiative from 
appearing on the ballot, unlike in states like Florida. 
Another possible danger with allowing the Lieutenant Governor to 
exercise this sort of initiative oversight is the fact that the public does not 
vote for the Lieutenant Governor directly. While the Lieutenant 
Governor is an elected position, Alaska uses a joint ticket system for the 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor offices.96 A voter is therefore unable 
to cast a vote for the Gubernatorial candidate from one ticket and the 
Lieutenant Governor candidate from another.  
This joint-election arrangement would not be much of a problem if 
the role of the Lieutenant Governor were simply to advise the Governor, 
but the position in Alaska has many independent responsibilities, 
including overseeing the Division of Elections.97 It is conceivable that an 
individual voter may prefer one individual for Governor but disagree 
with that individual’s choice of who should run the Division of 
Elections. Therefore, the connection between the two offices’ elections is 
concerning. However, this problem could be solved by the adoption of 
the proposal in Part V, and therefore while it may engender academic 
concern for now, it is easily rectifiable by the people of Alaska if they so 
choose.  
Yet another concern with the Lieutenant Governor having the 
power to stop initiatives before they reach the ballot is that the 
Lieutenant Governor’s powers are largely granted by law rather than by 
the Alaska Constitution.98 Those laws, and the Lieutenant Governor’s 
powers with them, can be made or altered by the people through 
initiatives.99 Therefore the Lieutenant Governor has the ability to reject 
an initiative that would directly pertain to his or her own powers and 
duties. 
There are two possible problems that this could cause. First, the 
Lieutenant Governor could prevent an initiative that would limit the 
office’s powers in order to retain as much control and authority over the 
government as possible. This sort of institutional power-grabbing has a 
long tradition in the United States,100 and it is inconceivable that no 
 
 95.  WATERS, supra note 65, at 48, 176. 
 96.  ALASKA CONST. art III, § 8. 
 97.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.105(a) (2012). 
 98.  ALASKA CONST. art III, § 7. But see ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2 (assigning 
the power to certify initiatives to the Lieutenant Governor). 
 99.  ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 11. 
 100.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (describing how assigning 
various powers to various branches allows those branches to resist 
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Lieutenant Governor would ever be tempted to prevent some aspect of 
his or her authority from being stripped. The second problem is that 
some particular Lieutenant Governor may not want an initiative to 
expand the powers and responsibilities of the office, either because of the 
simple laziness of the individual currently in office, or because of his or 
her political views. A libertarian-leaning Lieutenant Governor, for 
example, may be philosophically opposed to most government 
activity,101 and an increase in responsibility would be antithetical to that 
position. As such, the Lieutenant Governor may prevent an initiative 
from reaching the voters simply because it would expand the powers of 
the office beyond what the current officer believes they should be, 
despite the possibility that the people themselves desire more from their 
government. 
These problems, however, are ameliorated by the fact that the 
courts can review the decision of the Lieutenant Governor. This 
oversight-of-the-oversight means that the Lieutenant Governor’s own 
personal feelings—based in greed, laziness, or political alignment—will 
be unable to control whether or not an initiative makes it to the ballot. 
Only when an initiative is clearly unconstitutional, under existing 
controlling precedent, will a court uphold the Lieutenant Governor’s 
decision to prevent it from coming to a vote.102  
Therefore, while valid and serious concerns about the Lieutenant 
Governor’s power to prevent initiatives from appearing on the ballot do 
exist, those concerns do not outweigh the benefits when they are 
properly weighed with their solutions. The Lieutenant Governor, by 
virtue of his or her high-profile political position, and by virtue of his or 
her authority over the Division of Elections, is the ideal individual to 
oversee voter initiatives. That, combined with the time, effort, and 
monetary savings advance oversight generates, and the fact that 
advance oversight of unconstitutional initiatives will prevent 
constitutional violations from taking place while a challenge works its 





encroachments of the others and how ambitions counteract) 
 101.  See generally Libertarian Party Platform, LIBERTARIAN PARTY 1 (MAY 2012) 
https://www.lp.org/files/LP%20Platform%202012.pdf (“[Libertarians] 
challenge the cult of the omnipotent state.”). 
 102.  DesJarlais v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor, 300 P.3d 900, 903 
(Alaska 2013). 
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V. WHILE RESTRICTIONS ON THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR’S 
ADVANCE INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT MUST BE IMPOSED WITH CARE, 
ONE CHANGE IS WARRANTED 
As argued in Part IV, the current laws surrounding the Lieutenant 
Governor’s oversight of the initiative process are beneficial to the state 
and people of Alaska. With that in mind, any change to these laws must 
be made cautiously and with a full understanding of the potential 
ramifications. That does not mean that no changes are warranted, but it 
does mean that, in proposing any modification, one must fully outline 
(1) exactly what the change would do, (2) why it would improve some 
aspect of the process, and (3) how it would protect against any negative 
effects. This Part will argue for one such change—splitting the elections 
of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor—and address these three 
areas. However, this Part will first address two concerns associated with 
any changes calling for a reduction in the amount of initiative process 
oversight. 
Because there are two main reasons why advance initiative 
oversight in general is beneficial (as discussed in the Part IV) any 
attempt to restrict that oversight power must recognize and address 
those issues. First, no change should be made to the initiative oversight 
process unless that change does not lead to a waste in state resources. 
Second, no change should be made unless the constitutional rights of the 
people, especially those likely to be subject to discrimination, are 
protected. 
While certainly nothing legally prevents the state from eliminating 
this prior oversight—or even eliminating the initiative in its entirety—
practical concerns over how the state would be affected do. Because 
advance oversight over initiatives saves Alaska time, money, and 
effort,103 it would be unwise to make any change which would do away 
with those savings. Eliminating advance oversight of the initiative 
process would allow more initiatives to reach the ballot, which alone 
would increase the cost of elections. Assuming any of those initiatives 
passed into law, the resulting lawsuits would further consume the 
resources of the Alaskan judicial system. That in turn would result in 
either a heavier burden to the taxpayers (to pay for the additional staff 
needed for the increase in work), or in a reduction in the quality of 
service (because judges and lawyers would have more cases). These 
burdens may not be great, but it is hard to imagine how they would not 
exist in some form. For that reason, any attempt to reduce or eliminate 
 
 103.  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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advance initiative oversight is unwise on a practical level. 
Furthermore, because advance initiative oversight process protects 
the constitutional rights of Alaskans, it is unwise to modify the system 
without considering the issues that would arise if the oversight were 
reduced. Without the advance oversight process, laws could be passed 
which might hurt individuals in a clearly unconstitutional manner, and 
those individuals would have to seek relief after the fact. But if 
something is known to be unconstitutional, it would clearly be better, 
morally and politically, for it to not happen in the first place. The 
advance oversight process realizes this goal. Any modifications to the 
advance oversight of initiatives should therefore address this issue.  
 Keeping those concerns in mind, there is still at least one change to 
Alaska’s initiative process that would benefit the state and its people: 
the Lieutenant Governor should have no direct connections to the 
Governor and instead be a truly independent office. 
It is worth noting at the outset that this is not a change that would 
benefit most states. Alaska’s unique system of elections with the 
Lieutenant Governor, instead of the Secretary of State, at the head of the 
Division of Elections,104 however, makes the position particularly 
powerful and worthy of independent analysis and decision by the 
voters. 
There are two parts to this proposal. First, the Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor should be voted on and elected independently 
from each other. Second, a vacant Lieutenant Governor position should 
be filled by election, or by following a consistent line of succession, 
rather than by the appointment process currently in place. 
Currently, Alaska requires that the Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor be elected as a joint ticket.105 But because the Lieutenant 
Governor’s office has unique responsibilities, it would be more 
appropriate to have the two positions selected independently. For 
example, the people may wish for a particular individual to hold the 
position of Lieutenant Governor, but that individual may have personal 
disagreements with the candidate likely to win the governorship and 
therefore be unable to convince that candidate to include him or her on 
the ticket. Alternatively, the people may actively desire to have 
individuals from different political parties hold the two offices as some 
form of check on the consolidation of power. This Note does not mean to 
argue that the Governor and Lieutenant Governor will often represent 
opposite parties, but giving Alaskans the ability to make that 
 
 104.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.105(a) (2012). 
 105.  ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8. 
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determination for themselves could be beneficial. 
The second half of this proposal is more technical, but it stems from 
the same concerns as the first. While the constitution specifically forbids 
holding elections to fill such vacancy in the office of the Lieutenant 
Governor, it allows laws to be passed which would establish a 
continuing line of succession to the governorship.106 The current statute 
that governs this issue provides that “the governor shall appoint, from 
among the officers who head the principle departments of the state 
government or otherwise, a person to succeed to the office of lieutenant 
governor if the office of lieutenant governor becomes vacant.”107 
Therefore, the line of succession to the office of Lieutenant Governor is 
entirely determined, with legislative confirmation,108 by the Governor at 
the point of vacancy, and is not necessarily consistent between 
administrations. 
The current process for filling Lieutenant Governor vacancies 
leaves too much power in the hands of the Governor. Just as a particular 
gubernatorial candidate may prevent a qualified candidate from 
running on the same ticket as him or her, so too might a particular 
Governor refuse to appoint an otherwise qualified successor. Instead of 
allowing the Governor to determine who will be the Lieutenant 
Governor in the case of a vacancy, Alaska should establish either a 
standardized line of succession or allow for the election of a new 
individual to fill the vacancy. Of these two possibilities, the former is 
preferable.109  
Having a standardized line of succession is preferable to the 
current state of affairs because it would remove some of the influence 
the Governor currently has over the Lieutenant Governor’s position. 
Under the current system, if a Lieutenant Governor leaves office, the 
new Lieutenant Governor is whomever the Governor has handpicked 
for the position.110 With a set line of succession, the individual who 
would ascend to the position of Lieutenant Governor would likely still 
be selected by the Governor initially,111 but this is of less concern. As the 
 
 106.  Id. § 13. 
 107.  ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.040 (2012). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Establishing elections to fill vacancies in the Lieutenant Governor’s 
office would require even more tinkering with Article III, Section 8 of the Alaska 
Constitution, and may lead to counterintuitive results. For example, it would be 
odd to have the Lieutenant Governor replaced via election while the Governor is 
replaced by direct succession. 
 110.  ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.040 (2012). 
 111.  A rational line of succession would likely begin with the heads of the 
various principal departments, who are themselves appointed by the Governor 
and confirmed by the legislature. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25. 
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head of a principal department, presumably he or she will have been 
chosen for that role based on his or her skills at performing that 
particular job. It is mere happenstance that that position also places them 
in the line of succession. This may at first seem unappealing, because the 
alternative would be to have the Governor decide the next Lieutenant 
Governor based on qualifications for that position rather than to have 
the person chosen by chance. But if the Lieutenant Governor is truly 
independent from the Governor (which the independent elections 
discussed above are intended to reinforce), then allowing that single 
individual to make the determination seems odd. The Governor should 
not be the ultimate arbiter as to who would make the best Lieutenant 
Governor, and therefore a consistent line of succession should be 
established to remove the Governor from the decision-making process. 
 It is important to keep the concerns set out at the beginning of this 
Part in mind when considering the two parts of this proposal: holding 
separate elections for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and 
establishing a standardized line of succession for the latter. Those 
concerns are ensuring that the change would not increase the costs to the 
state and taxpayers, and guaranteeing that the change would protect 
Alaskans’ constitutional rights. 
However, this proposal does not run afoul of those concerns to any 
level that should be worrisome. While there may be some increase to 
costs for the state to print slightly longer ballots to cover two races 
rather than one, and to enact the laws necessary to realize the proposal, 
these are minimal and not the sort of costs that raise concern. Costs are 
concerning when they would lead to a large increase in the number of 
questions being presented to voters or when litigation would result.112 
But here no litigation will result from having two races for Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor, or from having a clearly established line of 
succession. Therefore, the first concern is alleviated. 
This proposal also does not affect any individual’s constitutional 
rights. Advance oversight over the initiative process would remain; the 
only changes being made are to how the official who performs that 
oversight is selected. By making that individual more accountable to the 
people, and by ensuring that the Governor is as removed from the 
selection of Lieutenant Governors as possible,113 this proposal simply 
 
 112.  See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 113.  See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE, THE 
EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES xiii (“Initiatives are the last resort of desperate citizens, a way 
to check the power of remote or arrogant lawmakers.”) (quoting Jeff Jacoby, A 
Jewel in the Crown of American Self-Government, BOSTON GLOBE (June 7, 2001), 
http://www.realdemocracy.com/jewel.htm). 
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establishes the Lieutenant Governor’s position as one deserving of 
careful consideration and respect. 
Because establishing the Lieutenant Governor’s position as truly 
independent from that of the Governor would neither interfere with 
Alaskans’ constitutional rights nor lead to a substantial increase in state 
expenditures, this proposal is not the sort that raises concerns about 
tampering with the existing advance oversight of initiatives.  
CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined Alaska’s unique approach to the initiative 
process. While Alaska is not alone in requiring initiatives to not be 
clearly unconstitutional before placement on the ballot, it is unique 
among states with an active initiative culture in placing the 
responsibility for that determination in the hands of the Lieutenant 
Governor. However, there are strong reasons both for advance oversight 
of initiatives generally, and for having the Lieutenant Governor, at least 
in Alaska, be the individual to exercise that power. 
While the Alaskan initiative process is therefore commendable, it is 
not without its minor flaws. In order to allow the people to truly choose 
the person who will represent them for such an important task, the 
Lieutenant Governor’s office should be more institutionally separated 
from that of the Governor. This separation should take two forms: first, 
the Lieutenant Governor and Governor should be elected separately 
rather than as a single ticket; and second, the Lieutenant Governor’s line 
of succession should be consistent between administrations and not left 
entirely to the discretion of the Governor. But in making this change, 
and especially in weighing any other modifications that would more 
directly affect the substance of advance initiative oversight, Alaska 
should be careful to consider both the costs to the state and the risk of 
constitutional harm that could befall its citizens. 
